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Abstract
For Part I, a supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) network consists of
a group of stations and substations in a portion of the power grid. The use of Internet
technology in SCADA communications as well as other factors has caused vulnerabilities.
One idea to help mitigate these risks is to strategically place trust nodes to compartmentalize and secure the SCADA systems without disturbing their ﬁnely honed processes. The
trust nodes combine ﬁrewall and intrusion detection technology to provide more secure
communication. An optimal solution to this problem has already been developed using
a mixed integer linear programming model (MILPM). Because the problem is provably
NP-Hard, a heuristic solution is presented in this part. The heuristic can ﬁnd good, but
not optimal, solutions. Experiments are promising that the proposed heuristic technique
is close to optimal while arriving at results much quicker.
For Part II, techniques to dynamically modify the defense structure are changing
routes of information, IP addresses, changing port numbers, and another other techniques
to make the adversary’s view obfuscated. These techniques could be used to prevent adversaries from gathering intelligence, seriously inhibiting their ability to conduct attacks
successfully. Work has already been done using a MILPM to solve the multi-commodity
capacitated network design problem (MCNDP) to create dynamically change routes and
possibly topologies within a network. Information ﬂows in the network can be periodically
routed on diﬀerent paths through the network so that traﬃc patterns change and adversaries have to work much harder to map the network. The MILPM solution others a good
baseline for comparison of any heuristic trying to solve the same problem. In this part,
a heuristic approach to network obfuscation is proposed. The heuristic shows favorable
results when compared to the MILPM solution.
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NETWORK SECURITY TOOLKIT INCLUDING HEURISTIC SOLUTIONS
FOR TRUST SYSTEM PLACEMENT AND NETWORK OBFUSCATION

1. Introduction
1.1

Background
This thesis is in two parts. The ﬁrst part discusses trust system placement. The

second part involves network obfuscation staring in Chapter 6. This chapter starts with
a brief survey of the research subject area and an overview of the key problem for this
research. This overview gives the motivation behind this thesis and why it is meaningful.
This chapter ﬁnishes with an outline of the remaining document.
Since our nation depends on electrical power to function even at a most basic level,
making the power grid secure is essential. The energy sector is a part of our critical
infrastructure and needs to be protected. Power grid security is a broad area, so this thesis
will focus on security of the supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) network. A
combination of security techniques are needed to secure the SCADA network, so narrowing
the scope more, the novel idea of the trust system placement technique is investigated in
this work.
SCADA systems control and manage various utility systems such as gas lines, water,
reﬁneries, nuclear plants, chemical plants, etc. Along with these utility systems, SCADA
more speciﬁcally is used for the electric power grid. In 1996 Executive Order 13010 made
the energy sector part of the nation’s critical infrastructure [5]. Some headlines involving
the power grid are, “Spies ‘inﬁltrate US power grid’ ”, [22] and “Grid is Vulnerable to
Cyber-Attacks” [12]. Since the power grid is a part of the critical infrastructure and
because of headlines like these, securing the power grid is extremely important.
SCADA monitoring and control systems were created before computer systems were
as open as they are today. Security was not a priority. Power engineers were more worried
about meeting time requirements of protection and control systems with consistent data
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transmission times than with network security. Most of the systems were proprietary and
protected. Unlike today when more and more systems are compiling to recent standards
like IEC 61850 and IEEE C37.1-2007. This suggests that the future of the power grid
will rely more on communication and use more open standards that are more susceptible
[7][14]. Because the power grid has become and is becoming more open, our enemies are
more aware of power grid vulnerabilities than they have ever been before. This threat
needs to be addressed to secure the SCADA network.
One diﬃculty with the SCADA network that serves as motivation for the thesis
research is that SCADA systems monitor and control the power grid and cannot be halted
to install security systems. The nature of the power grid dictates that the SCADA system
will always be running. The entire system cannot be shut down, but portions of one
system can be shut down. This fact complicates any upgrades or replacements making
them hard and expensive. The results of this research can be implemented incrementally
with insigniﬁcant interruptions of service while increasing the protection in the system.
Earlier eﬀorts in this research area have deﬁned the concept of a trust system [6].
A trust system is a combination of security entities like a ﬁrewall and intrusion detection. Continued further research in this area takes the trust system and plans where they
should be installed. Trust systems are compatible with legacy SCADA components, but an
extra trust system component would need to be added in some cases. Installing trust systems at key locations in the SCADA network can compartmentalize it and provide secure
communication between these compartments.

1.2

Problem Statement
Compartmentalization is the goal of the trust system placement problem (TSPP).

Compartmentalization is dividing the network into smaller subsets nodes for the purpose
of securing communication between them. The TSPP will be described in more detail
later, but here is just a brief summary. Compartmentalization and trust system placement
are fairly similar, because when a trust system is placed at a node it basically acts as a
wall between clusters. The communication between clusters will be protected by a trust

2

system, which will provide ﬁrewall and intrusion detection systems. If a virus or malware
infects one cluster, the trust system should stop it from spreading to other clusters.
One problem that makes it diﬃcult to implement security systems such as the trust
system, is that the trust system could disrupt the time-sensitive protection and control
systems. Power engineers designed the SCADA system to perform in narrow time windows; therefore, any security system for the SCADA system will need to heed these strict
performance requirements. Many SCADA system messages require an action or response
within a few milliseconds, so the trust system needs to be able to operate in this acute
time frame.
Since earlier eﬀorts have already provided a solution to the TSPP, other research
problems come into focus. One of these problems is scalability. A previous solution had
problems producing results for SCADA networks of 30 nodes or more. A heuristic approach
to the TSPP should result in a more scalable solver. To realistically apply this to a SCADA
network a TSPP solver will need to handle networks with thousands of nodes, because, for
example, the New York ISO is nearly 3,000 nodes.
Another problem related to scalability is run time. One of the major factors holding
back the scalability is how long one would have to wait for a result to the 30 node network.
If it takes days to get a 30 node result, how long will it take to get a 3,000 node result?
Basically the answer is too long; therefore, a quicker TSPP solver is needed.
The purpose of the research in Part I is to solve the problem that was just brieﬂy
discussed. The hypothesis of this thesis is that one can create compartmentalized network
topologies and place trust systems in a quicker and more eﬃcient manner facilitating
scalability to larger networks.

1.3

Preview
Many diﬀerent layers and angles of security should be taken to secure the SCADA

network. One angle that can be used as part of a comprehensive package to help secure the
SCADA network is a solution to the TSPP. Previous research used a mixed integer linear
programming model (MILPM) to optimally solve the TSPP [3], but this optimal solution
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takes a considerable amount of time. Of course, applying good heuristics to the problem
should achieve a more realistic run time at the cost of being slightly less optimal.
One such heuristic solution is the Power Domain Calculator (PDC) which is my
contribution. The PDC is a heuristic approximation of the trust system placement problem.
As far as I know, no heuristic exists for the trust system placement problem, only an optimal
MILPM for the trust system placement problem. The PDC uses a series of polynomial
time algorithms to arrive at a good solution. The algorithms the PDC uses are Dijkstra’s
algorithm, vertex cover factor-two approximation, depth ﬁrst search, and greedy set cover
heuristic. All of these algorithms allow the PDC to narrow in on a solution quickly.
In summary, this chapter gives a concise general introduction to this research area
and overview that deﬁnes the focus and research problem. Then looking forward . . .
∙ Chapter two presents the more detailed background of SCADA networks including
a time line of legacy SCADA systems and speciﬁc time requirements on SCADA
messages. Then it surveys a few related SCADA security components because this
research is a component of an overall security design. The last part of chapter two
discusses past work that this thesis builds upon.
∙ Chapter three starts by walking through 14-node example describing the problem.
Then the PDC heuristic steps are enumerated with various snap shots of a 30-node
example as it was solved.
∙ Chapter four discusses the implementation details including input and output. Then
the PDC results are compared to the MILPM results when applicable, and when not
applicable the scalability and run times are discussed.
∙ Chapter ﬁve concludes part one of the document discussing the meaning of the results
and oﬀers recommendations for further research in this topic area.
∙ Chapters 6-10 will discuss network obfuscation, and a diﬀerent heuristic will be presented.
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2. Literature Review
2.1

Chapter Overview
This chapter represents the foundation upon which the rest of this work builds.

First, it reviews the development of SCADA over the years, giving perspective on where
today’s SCADA system came from. Then a few diﬀerent SCADA security techniques are
discussed. Toward the end and most importantly, an optimal trust system placement
solution is presented and the TSPP is deﬁned. The optimal solution and TSPP directly
relate to the rest of this thesis.

2.2

SCADA History
Historically power grid personnel were able to use SCADA systems to control the

processes in real time, but now with the evolution of the Internet and telecommunications technology they do have that ability. Table 1 overviews how SCADA systems have
developed historically. The SCADA tasks of supervisory control, data acquisition, and automatic generation control all started separately, but now are beginning to operate over the
same networks. Supervisory control allows operators to remotely control elements of the
electric system. Data acquisition is for remotely monitoring and recording the state of the
system. Finally, automatic generation control is equipment that automatically responds
to signals controlling the power output of electric generators. All three of the functions
are coordinated by the overarching energy management system or SCADA system. Initially, the term SCADA did not refer to automatic generation control because this type of
autonomy did not exist in early SCADA systems.
SCADA systems became more interesting when operators of the power grid wanted
to remotely monitor and control distant substations. Pilot wire systems and step switching
systems allowed operators to run wires between stations and substations to supervise them.
In the 1950’s, relay/tone systems used telephone lines to send messages by varying the tones
on the wire. In the mid 1960’s when computers became capable of real time functions it
became much easier to log data and do many other functions. In order to maintain secure
communications, SCADA systems used character codes other than ASCII. This is security
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by obscurity as opposed to security by design. These character codes were governed by
proprietary protocols [21]. Graphic control monitors came about in the 1980’s, replacing
the push button and digital displays, making it easier to interact with the system. Then
in 1987, IEEE released its standards as guidelines for designing SCADA networks. Seven
short years later IEEE released the 1994 update [13]. The rapid modernization of the power
grid, especially since the mid 1990’s, has made the SCADA systems more inter-operable.
However, they are more vulnerable to attack.
In addition to the transition to Internet technology, public standards such as IEC
61850 and IEEE PC37.1 have contributed to this vulnerability [2]. Since the standards
are public, anyone can know them and can interact with systems that use the standards.
This is an authentication vulnerability, so SCADA systems need measures in place to
authenticate messages especially between diﬀerent power companies.

2.3

Power Engineers and IT Personnel Argument
The current state of protection in the SCADA system is not adequate. The system

has many ﬂaws and problems that need to be ﬁxed starting with the conﬂict between power
engineers and IT personnel. The IT personnel are familiar with systems that are much
more delay-tolerant than the SCADA systems. Power engineers correctly reject traditional
network security mechanisms because they will upset the speed of operation in this ﬁnely
honed processes. The IT professional cannot implement traditional security systems in a

Table 1
1940’s
1950’s
Mid 1960’s
Early 1970’s
1979
1980’s
1987
1994
2000’s
2007

SCADA History

Early Systems
Relay/Tone Systems
Computers were capable of real time functions
Proprietary communication protocols were developed
Early ANSI/IEEE SCADA Standards
Graphic control interfaces
Updated IEEE SCADA Standards
Revised IEEE SCADA Standards
Automatic decision making and issuing commands
Current IEEE SCADA Standards
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SCADA environment, because the environment has strict timing constraints and cannot
tolerate the delay normal systems create.
Both parties can agree that the PDC is a good way to resolve the situation. The
power engineers can be glad that the PDC takes into account the necessary response time.
The PDC decides where to place trust nodes, so all necessary system responses will be
timely. The IT personnel can be assured that the SCADA network is more secure, because
the PDC creates secure domains to help prevent malicious behavior and to help prevent
the spread of malicious content.

2.4

Time Constraints
SCADA systems operate under strict timing constraints, some of which are just a

few milliseconds. In Coates’ research he developed time constraints that need to be met
within these systems. The results were compiled into Table 2, which speciﬁcally states the
purpose of each constraint [6]. Timeliness of message delivery is crucial. Implementing
security into the system should not disrupt this timeliness.
Table 2

SCADA Timing Constraints [6]

Systems
Substation Intelligent
Electronic Devices (IEDs);
Primary short circuit
protection and control

Situation
Routine power equipment signal
measurement
Local-area disturbance

Backup protection and
control; Wide area
protection and control
(WAPaC)

Transient voltage instability

SCADA

Response Time
Every 2-4 ms

Frequency instability, must respond
faster than generator governors to trip
generators instantaneously
Dynamic instability
Poorly damped or un-damped
oscillations
Voltage instability
Thermal overload
Emergency event notification
Routine transactions
Routine HMI status polling from
substation field devices
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< 4 ms from event detection to sending
notification
4 - 40 ms automatic response time
Often < 180 ms to convey 14+ trip signals to disconnect
generators at the top generating station
Could require < 300 ms response time (by load shedding)
for high rates of frequency decay; requires detection within
100 ms to allow operator response in 150 to 300 ms
A few seconds
Several seconds
Up to a few minutes
Several minutes for severe overloads, rarely less than a few
seconds for minor occurrences
< 6 ms
< 540 ms
Every 2 seconds

2.5

Trust System
These SCADA systems were originally designed to be stand-alone systems, so net-

working them creates security problems. The problems need to be attacked from many
angles. Researchers have already taken some diﬀerent angles. A few examples are the trust
system and agent-based backup protection.
The trust system concept provides a multifaceted security system, including ﬁrewall
and intrusion detection. It is a software agent that plugs into an existing network to assign
risk levels to events and create status updates which could indicate a negative eﬀect on
utility services [6]. The trust system introduces a latency that is estimated to be 600
microseconds [3]. In general, the trust system preforms security analysis and response.
Ideally, it would be installed on the existing hardware, so no new hardware is needed for
implementation. In some cases, the legacy systems will require new hardware components
that can run alongside the systems already in place.
The trust system intercepts status messages or commands sent between master station and substation. If the network has legacy nodes, then a protocol gateway plug-in would
be required, for the trust system to interpret and analyze the various message formats [6].
The trust system also validates input. If data is not validated, the data is identiﬁed as
bad data or a security risk with the proper alerts and response actions. Furthermore, the
trust system also performs access control to make sure that only authorized personnel see
the data.
Although the trust system concept is designed for SCADA networks, it cannot be
implemented at every node because of the strict timing constraints. Many trust systems put
together cumulatively add too much delay into the network. Since legacy systems cannot
handle a trust system implemented at every node in the network, an idea was suggested
that trust systems be “added in strategic locations” to help mitigate this problem [6].

2.6

Backup Protection
The backup protection scheme helps secure SCADA networks. No single security en-

tity provides a suﬃcient amount of protection. A layered approach including a backup pro-
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tection scheme would be ideal. Actually this reputation-based backup protection scheme
enhances the eﬀectiveness of the other existing network protection mechanisms such as
intrusion detection and ﬁrewalls [2].
Backup protection is the type of protection that activates only when primary protection and maybe a secondary protection fail. Backup protection uses sensors to detect
a failure on a power line in an element such as a circuit breaker or an entire relay. If a
failure is detected, the next device on the line becomes responsible for failure protection.
This reputation-based backup protection system not only protects from normal failures but
also protects against malicious or byzantine failures. It uses agents with trust components
making assessments to estimate the trustworthiness of cooperating agents.
The main idea of this backup protection scheme starts with the sharing of status
information, such as voltage, current, etc. In the most basic scenario, just a stream of
update messages validates that the source of the agent-based relay is working properly and
should be trusted. Then these readings coming from other systems can be compared to
those read locally at the relay. The relays are trusted if the readings are within tolerance,
frequency, and time frame. The trust value is lowered if the thresholds are violated.

Figure 1

Power line between two generators. The fault location is at the midpoint
between breaker 5(B5) and breaker 6(B6) [2]

An example scenario is visualized in Figure 1. This example consists of two power
generators, one at each end separated by three substations and connected together by four
transmission lines. Every transmission line is protected by two circuit breakers, one at
either end of the line. Each breaker is controlled by a relay. The vertical lines indicate
power going out to service destinations. As status messages are sent between these relays,
the trust values are updates. The trust value is considered in a decision matrix whenever
9

a situation arises. If a fault happens, the time needed to clear the fault is reduced by at
least 50% when compared to traditional protective relays [2].

2.7

Optimal Trust System Placement Solution
The idea is to place trust systems at strategic locations to help this security problem.

A trust system is a ﬁrewall and intrusion detection system. Then a trust node is a station
that has a trust system installed. To clarify, even though it is called a trust node, it is not a
node or a bus. It is a device that is installed at a bus to add secure communication through
the bus. The network needs to be subdivided into domains to increase the security. This
compartmentalization isolates attacks and malfunctions, so they can be dealt with in the
aﬀected area. The compartments prevent a rapid cascade eﬀect throughout the power grid
[11].
A trust node introduces a small amount, 600 microseconds, of extra delay into the
network, but when it adds up, it creates too much delay if a message has to pass through
too many trust nodes. Therefore, a trust system cannot be placed at every node, but
one must try to place them at key nodes. This alludes to the need for timing constraints
discussed in Section 2.4. A timing constraint can be described as a time threshold for a
given source-destination pair. Since the trust node introduces more delay than a normal
node, it will take less trust nodes compared to normal nodes on the route in between source
and destination to violate the constraint.
Two control parameters are set in order to tune the output. Those parameters are
the minimum number of nodes per domain, 𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛 , and maximum number of trust nodes.
Both of these input parameters would be provided by the power company. To determine
the maximum number of trust nodes a power company should consider how much it would
cost to implement a certain number of trust nodes. If its funds are not an issue, then a
realistic number of trust nodes should do well. For the 𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛 , the power company should
choose a number less than ﬁfty percent of because then the network can be divided into
at least two domains. The 𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛 may need to be adjusted for the particular network once
the results are analyzed.
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Figure 2

Optimal Trust System Placement Results [11]

11
(h) 7 trust nodes, 4 nodes per domain minimum

(g) 7 trust nodes, 2 nodes per domain minimum

(i) 7 trust nodes, 7 nodes per domain minimum

(f) 4 trust nodes, 7 nodes per domain minimum

(c) 2 trust nodes, 7 nodes per domain minimum

the minimum number of trust nodes if that variable is small,
regardless of the value of the overall number of nodes. At the
same time, the result is bounded by the minimum number of
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arise in real systems once queuing and processing delays are
taken into account in real systems. It was observed that when
the input contains messages (or traffic) that exceeds its

Fig. 3. Configuration changes using different input values on the same scenario. In all cases, edge weights represent propagation delay in μs.

(e) 4 trust nodes, 4 nodes per domain minimum

(b) 2 trust nodes, 4 nodes per domain minimum

(d) 4 trust nodes, 2 nodes per domain minimum

(a) 2 trust nodes, 2 nodes per domain minimum

> REPLACE THIS LINE WITH YOUR PAPER IDENTIFICATION NUMBER (DOUBLE-CLICK HERE TO EDIT) <

The optimal results in Figure 2 are organized by these two parameters. Each row is
organized by a maximum number of trust nodes set to 2, 4, and 7, respectively, from top to
bottom. Each column is similarly organized by a minimum number of nodes per domain set
to 2, 4, and 7, respectively, from left to right. In the left column, as the maximum number
of trust nodes increases the number of domains produced increases as well. However, in
the right column, even though the number of trust nodes allowed increased, it has no eﬀect
on the result. In some scenarios allowing more trust nodes results in more domains being
created, yet in others it has no eﬀect.
This optimal trust system placement solution uses a MILPM. A summary of the key
constraints are:
∙ Each node is assigned to exactly one domain. (Equation 2)
∙ No more than one trust system can be assigned to a node to make it a trust node.
(Equation 3)
∙ Ensure that at least one endpoint of every branch going from one domain to another
is a trust node. (Equation 4 and 5)
∙ Enforces timing constraints so that the total weight of the path is under the threshold.
(Equation 6)

2.8

Trust System Placement Problem
This section deﬁnes the TSPP in the context of a MILPM. A MILPM is a math-

ematical model to solve problems, speciﬁcally the TSPP case. The full MILPM for the
TSPP is presented in Appendix A. Some of the components that make up the TSPP are a
graph with nodes and edges, constraints with a speciﬁed transmission time threshold, the
maximum number of trust nodes, and the minimum domain size. A network is represented
by a simple graph 𝐺, which consists of a set 𝑉 (𝐺) of buses (vertices) and a set of 𝐸(𝐺)
of branches (edges). Let 𝑛𝑉 = ∣𝑉 (𝐺)∣ be the number of buses and let 𝑛𝐸 = ∣𝐸(𝐺)∣ be the
number of edges. Denote an arbitrary bus by using 𝑣 and an arbitrary branch by using 𝑒.
𝑉 (𝐺) and 𝐸(𝐺) can be indexed by writing 𝑣 ∈ 𝑉 (𝐺) and 𝑒 ∈ 𝐸(𝐺). Speciﬁc buses will be
referred to by using subscripts. For buses, we write 𝑣𝑖 ∈ 𝑉 (𝐺), where 𝑖 = 1, . . . , 𝑛𝑉 .
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Split 𝐺 into domains such that a collection of 𝑛𝑉 subsets 𝐷1 , . . . , 𝐷𝑛𝑉 . Some 𝐷𝑖
can be empty so that other subsets can contain the minimum number of nodes, denoted
by 𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛 . Let 𝑧𝑖 be a binary variable with 𝑧𝑖 = 0 when 𝐷𝑖 is empty and 𝑧𝑖 = 1 when 𝐷𝑖
is not empty. The sum of 𝑧𝑖 gives the total number of domains into which 𝐺 is divided.
The goal is to maximize the objective function seen in Equation 1. The objective function
maximizes the number of domains. We want to maximize the number of domains because
the more domains their are the more secure the network.
𝑛𝑉
∑

𝑧𝑖

(1)

𝑖=1

Equation 2 makes sure that each node is assigned to exactly one domain. Let 𝑥𝑖𝑗 be
a location in a 𝑛𝑉 × 𝑛𝑉 matrix where 𝑥𝑖𝑗 = 1 if 𝑣𝑖 ∈ 𝐷𝑗 and 𝑥𝑖𝑗 = 0 otherwise.

𝑥𝑖𝑗 = 1 for 𝑖 = 1, . . . , 𝑛𝑣

(2)

Equation 3 allows no more than one trust system to be assigned to a node to make
it a trust node. Let 𝑛𝑇 be the number of trust nodes. Let 𝑦𝛼𝑖 be a location in a 𝑛𝑇 × 𝑛𝑉
matrix where 𝑦𝛼𝑖 = 1 if trust node is placed at bus 𝑖 and 𝑦𝛼𝑖 = 0 otherwise.

𝑦𝛼𝑖 ≤ 1 for 𝑖 = 1, . . . , 𝑛𝑣

(3)

Now both Equation 4 and 5 ensure that at least one endpoint of every branch going
from one domain to another is a trust node. Let ℎ𝑖𝑗 be a location in a 𝑛𝑉 × 𝑛𝑉 matrix
where ℎ𝑖𝑗 = 1 if an edge from 𝑖 to 𝑗 connects one domain to another and ℎ𝑖𝑗 = 0 otherwise.
Basically the edge is not in a domain but in between two domains.

𝑦𝛼𝑖 ≤

𝑛𝑉
∑

ℎ𝑖𝑗 for 𝛼 = 1, . . . , 𝑛𝑇 and 𝑖 = 1, . . . , 𝑛𝑣

(4)

𝑗=1

𝑛𝑇
∑

(𝑦𝛼𝑖 + 𝑦𝛼𝑗 ) ≥ ℎ𝑖𝑗 for 𝑖, 𝑗 = 1, . . . , 𝑛𝑣

𝛼=1
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(5)

Equation 6 enforces timing constraints so that the total weight of the path is under
the threshold. A path (or route) in 𝐺 is an alternating list of nodes and edges, beginning
and ending with a node, such that consecutive nodes are connected by the edge listed
between them. Note that no cycles are allowed. Let 𝑛𝑃 be the number of paths. Let
𝑃𝑘 be a path in the network where 𝑘 = 1, . . . , 𝑛𝑃 . Each path has a predetermined delay
tolerance, denoted by 𝜏𝑘 . Let 𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑘 = 1 if an edge from 𝑖 to 𝑗 is in the path 𝑃𝑘 . Similarly, let
𝑐′𝑖𝑗𝑘 = 1 if an edge from 𝑖 to 𝑗 is in the path 𝑃𝑘 that has an additional edge from 𝑗 directly
to 𝑖. Finally, let 𝑏𝑖𝑗 be a location in a 𝑛𝑉 × 𝑛𝑉 matrix where 𝑏𝑖𝑗 is the weight of the edge
from 𝑖 to 𝑗 if the edges exists, and 𝑏𝑖𝑗 = 0 otherwise.

⎡⎛
⎞ (
)⎤
𝑛𝑉
𝑛𝑉 ∑
𝑛𝑉
𝑛𝑉
𝑛𝑇
∑
∑
∑
∑
1
𝛿
⎣⎝
(𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑘 ⋅ 𝑏𝑖𝑗 ) + ⋅
⋅
𝑐′𝑖𝑗𝑘 ⎠ ⋅
𝑦𝛼𝑖 ⎦ ≤ 𝜏𝑘 for 𝑘 = 1, . . . , 𝑛𝑃
2
2
𝑖=1 𝑗=1

2.9

𝑖=1

(6)

𝛼=1

𝑗=1

Summary
This chapter discussed the underlying literature that supports this thesis. It began

with time line of SCADA history. Throughout history, SCADA systems have developed
by public standards and reliance on Internet technology. While these are good, they have
also created security ﬂaws. These ﬂaws are more diﬃcult to overcome because of the strict
time constraints under how the SCADA system operates. This chapter speciﬁed the exact
time constraints that the SCADA system functions under. Then it described the need for
more SCADA security and explored diﬀerent techniques that have be proposed. Previous
research has given society the trust system, optimal trust system placement, and agentbased backup protection to help mitigate the security ﬂaws. Nothing in the literature
exists to address in the scalability of the current trust system placement solutions. The
next chapter proposes a solution that will ﬁx this problem.
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3. Methodology
3.1

Chapter Overview
The previous chapter describes an optimal trust system placement solution that

uses compartmentalization to make the power grid more secure while satisfying timing
constraints on message delivery. Compartmentalizing the grid into secure domains should
be part of a comprehensive security system. This chapter introduces a heuristic to the
trust system placement problem furthering the research to secure the power grid.
The main goal of this research is to help secure the power grid. To do this, some
other secondary goals must be met. These goals include ﬁnding a compromise between
power engineers and information technology (IT) personnel. Another goal is to provide a
solution that can account for the limited budgets some power companies have to invest in
security systems. The ﬁnal goal is to create a solution that is scalable to realistic sized
SCADA networks. Since the solution needs to be scalable, the challenge is to create a
good heuristic that can solve the problem in an eﬀective and timely manner. In Section
2.4, overcoming the time constraints previously mentioned is another challenge.

3.2

Research Objective and Problem Description
The objective is to divide the SCADA network into as many domains as possible

while placing trust nodes into the network. A MILPM optimization calculates the optimal
solution for a given number of trust nodes required and given level of security which has
already been done [11]. MILPM makes it fairly easy to ﬁgure out if a solution is optimal;
however, MILPM optimization adds signiﬁcant computational time. As opposed to a
MILPM optimization, a heuristic solution can solve the trust system placement problem
much quicker and on much larger SCADA systems. The heuristic solution is called the
Power Domain Calculator (PDC). The PDC is my contribution for the ﬁrst part of this
thesis.
The trust system placement problem consists of an input network representing a
portion of the power grid. Diﬀerent types of traﬃc are sent through the network with each
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type of traﬃc having a diﬀerent response time depending on the criticality of the message
traﬃc. These response times are enumerated in Table 2 near Section 2.4.
To quickly overview the problem a visual representation is shown in Figures 3, 4, and
5. The problem is exactly like the problem discussed in Section 2.7. The discussion about
an optimal solution, but the goal of this research is to create a heuristic solution called
the PDC for the same problem. The PDC is an implemented algorithm showing that the
network can be subdivided into smaller clusters or domains in order to isolate anomalies
or intrusions. This compartmentalization into domains is due to the placement of trust
systems at particular nodes.

Figure 3

Visual representation of 14 bus test case [4]
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3.3

Power Systems Test Case Archive
The University of Washington has a Power Systems Test Case Archive which has

several test case data sets that are used in this research [4]. Most of the data sets were
created from actual power systems that can be seen in Appendix B. Those images derived
from the data which is stored in the IEEE Common Data format. The data sets provide
more detailed information than this problem needs, so this research will focus on the bus
and the branch data of each test case. Buses represent nodes in the network and branches
denote the connections between the buses. Therefore, the bus and branch data (Figure 3)
can be represented as graph of nodes and edges (Figure 4). These test cases serve as input
to the PDC.

Input network:
Not compartmenatlized
(domains)
Minimal security
protection

Nodes = Substations (Buses)
Edges = Communication between
substations (Branches)
Weights = Propagation Delay

8

1

3

15

7

10
10

21

1

1

1

2

18

4

6

18

4

1

17

5

9

40

26

14

11

53

1

6

21

13

30

69

12

38

Figure 4

Graph of 14 node test case with edge weights [3]
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3.4

Problem Input Graph
The input is a text ﬁle that provides the components of a graph. These are a set

of branches (edges), a set of buses (nodes), a set of delays in those branches, and traﬃc
represented by its path. All of these components except the traﬃc paths are visually
represented in Figure 4. The input also provides constants that are used in the solution
process.
The two main constants are the maximum number of trust nodes and the minimum
number of nodes per domain. The maximum number of trust nodes serves a couple of
purposes. First, if a power company only has enough money to buy ﬁve trust systems,
then the maximum number of trust systems can be set to ﬁve. The other purpose for
setting a number of trust nodes is that the number of trust nodes aﬀects the number of
domains. Typically the more trust nodes the more domains, but that is not always the
case [11]. The duty of the minimum number of nodes per domain is to encourage the
domains to be close to the same size. The minimum number of nodes per domain or 𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛
eliminates the possibility of having domains that are too small.
In order to create a graph representation of the 14 bus test case, one must make
nodes from the buses and edges from the branches. The test case archive did not provide
distances or delays between locations, so they had to be calculated separately. These edge
weights or delay times between nodes were calculated according to a formula derived in a
previous AFIT thesis [3]. It is important that the delay is always less than the response
time threshold. That thesis describes a process by which the delays can be derived:
1. Electrical resistance (𝑅): The test case data not only provided buses and branches
but also provided branch resistance which can be measured in ohms (Ω).
2. Area (𝐴): This is the cross-sectional area of the material in square meters (𝑚2 ). In
this case the area is 0.00080642𝑚2 .
3. Resistivity (𝜌): The process makes an assumption that the branches are aluminum
with an iron core wires. This assumption allows a constant electrical resistivity value
of 2.50018 × 10−8 Ω𝑚 [3]. Resistivity is normally calculated by the Equation 7, but
in this case the resistivity is known. ℓ is the length of the wire in meters.
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𝜌=𝑅×

𝐴
ℓ

(7)

4. Distance (ℓ): The length of the wire in meters (𝑚). Knowing the length is one step
closer to ﬁguring out the delay. Solve for ℓ in the previous resistivity Equation 7 and
get the distance Equation 8

ℓ=𝑅×

𝐴
𝜌

(8)

5. Once the distance is acquired, that value has to be multiplied by three, because the
cable used in the transmission of electricity is composed of three wires [3].
6. The process concludes by expressing the latency as a function of time. To do this
the velocity formula is solved for time and is seen in Equation 9. Speed is the other
factor here, and the process makes another assumption. It assumes that ﬁber optic
cables making signal propagate at the speed of light.

𝑇 𝑖𝑚𝑒 =

ℓ
𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑑

(9)

This process produces a constant propagation delay on edges in the network. The
calculation scheme relies on the assumption that networks were designed where utility communication traﬃc will not cause congestion. This assumption seems reasonable knowing
that the utility communication is a part of our nation’s critical infrastructure. As part
of a critical infrastructure, one can assume that it is well designed and maintained. The
communication packets in utility networks are generally smaller than Internet traﬃc [11].
With these small packets the queues are not likely to ﬁll, for the expectation is that delays
will remain fairly constant. This assumption will not hold in the case where congestion
starts to build up, so extra care must be taken to ensure that congestion does not occur.
The timing constraints help take care of congestion.
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3.5

Domains and Trust Nodes
In order to increase the security of the network, the input graph needs to be subdi-

vided into domains. This compartmentalization isolates the eﬀects of attacks or malfunctions. This way they can be dealt with in only the small area they aﬀect. The domains
can help prevent faults of various types. One particular dangerous fault condition would
be a voltage collapse which leads to a rapid cascading blackout.

Nodes = Substations (Buses)
Edges = Communication between substations
(Branches)
Weights = Propagation Delay

Output Network
Divided into domain
Domains protected by
trust nodes

8

Red buses = Trust nodes
Colored regions= Domains(sub-networks)
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Figure 5

Visual representation of 14 node test case with domains and trust nodes assigned [3]

The PDC takes the input graph and calculates a result placement for trust nodes
to partition the network. An example is Figure 5. The PDC has placed trust systems at
key locations (the red nodes) and has speciﬁed the domains (circled groups of nodes). The
trust nodes compartmentalize the network into domains, because each edge that goes from
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one domain to another has a trust node on at least one end. In other words, to move from
one domain to another, network traﬃc must go through a trust system.
In addition to the compartmentalization, trust nodes are “installed” at strategic
buses. This security system inherently adds delay to the network. Because of this delay,
the number of trust nodes is limited. Section 2.5 has a more detailed description of the
trust node or trust system.
The purpose is to be able to partition the network into as many domains as possible
and to install as many trust nodes as possible without causing any type of traﬃc to be
delayed longer than its necessary response time. The ability for the systems in the network
to communicate in a timely fashion is crucial for safe operation of the power grid.

3.6

Heuristic Approach
The challenge in creating a solution that is scalable comes from the fact that the

trust node assignment problem is NP-Hard [11]. Since it is NP-Hard, one cannot expect to
ﬁnd an eﬃcient algorithm. If the goal is to scale to thousands of nodes, a good heuristic is
needed. The PDC achieves this goal. The PDC is fast, but it does not always ﬁnd optimal
solutions.
The primary input for the PDC will be a network represented by a simple graph 𝐺,
which consists of a set 𝑉 (𝐺) of vertices (nodes, buses) and a set 𝐸(𝐺) of edges (branches).
Let 𝑛𝑉 = ∣𝑉 (𝐺)∣ be the number of vertices and let 𝑛𝐸 = ∣𝐸(𝐺)∣ be the number of edges.
These mathematical terms are deﬁned to perform an analysis of the PDC’s complexity.
The PDC is a series of steps that quickly narrows in on a solution. The PDC has to
consider both trust node placement and domain coverage when ﬁnding a solution. A set of
coverage domains does not specify the location of the trust nodes and yet the location of the
trust nodes does not specify a set of coverage domains. If the PDC only considered making
coverage domains, then the trust node location to get such a compartmentalization would
be unknown. If the PDC were to only consider placement of trust nodes, then the speciﬁc
compartmentalization of coverage domains would be unknown. The following solution
considers both trust node placement and domain coverage within the same context.
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A 30-node example (Figure 6) will help illustrate how the PDC works as the steps
are discussed. The PDC steps are the following:
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Visual representation of 30 node test case

1. This ﬁrst step is a check to make sure the input is valid and a proper solution is
feasible. After the input is read, the PDC ensures that all communication timing
constraints can be met. For each timing constraint path, Dijkstra’s algorithm ﬁnds
the shortest path. Then it makes sure the total delay on that path is within the
constraints threshold. This can be done in 𝑂(𝑛𝐸 log 𝑛𝑉 ) time per constraint [9].
This step is just a feasibility check. If this does not pass, the PDC has no reason to
continue.
2. The next part of the PDC uses a recognized factor-two approximation heuristic to
ﬁnd a vertex cover for the graph. This vertex cover solution is known to be a factortwo approximation which means it is no worse than twice the optimal solution. The
factor-2 approximation visits each edge in the graph. Upon visiting an edge, if either
endpoint of the edge has been covered, it moves to the next edge. Otherwise, both
endpoints are added to the cover. The result is a vertex covering set that is at most
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twice the size of the minimum covering set [9]. According to the NP-Hard proof of
the trust system placement problem, vertex covers are just a restricted case of the
trust node placement problem [11]. Therefore, they form a good initial step towards
a general solution by eliminating potential trust nodes. The covering set of vertices
are marked as possible trust nodes. Since every node and edge has to be examined
at least once, this phase takes 𝑂(𝑛𝐸 + 𝑛𝑉 ) time.
3. Step three repeats the ﬁrst step, but this time it is not merely a check but is also
an adjustment to the solution. The PDC uses Dijkstra’s algorithm again to test the
timing constraints by taking the added trust node delays into account. This time,
if a timing constraint is violated, trust nodes are removed along the path until the
constraint is met. This phase takes 𝑂(𝑛𝐸 log 𝑛𝑉 + 𝑛𝑉 ) time per timing constraint.
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Visual representation of 30 node test case with potential domains and trust
nodes

4. Now the PDC begins constructing possible domains in the graph. The PDC uses a
depth ﬁrst search to ﬁnd neighboring nodes. Backtracking occurs when there are no
more unexplored edges or when a trust node is encountered. All discovered nodes,
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including the trust nodes, are combined into a domain. The depth ﬁrst search is
continually run until all nodes are a part of a domain. At this point only trust nodes
are on the exterior of their domains. Also non-trust nodes will only be a part of one
domain, but trust nodes can be in multiple domains. This phase takes Θ(𝑛𝐸 + 𝑛𝑉 )
time.
Figure 7 visualizes the state of the graph at the end of this phase. All of the
red nodes indicate possible trust nodes, and all of the circled sets of nodes indicate
domains. Note that the minimum domain size, 𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 6, and the maximum number
of trust nodes, 𝑡𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 10. At this point the PDC is far from a solution since no
domain has 6 nodes and more than 10 nodes are red, However the PDC has made
some progress toward a solution eliminating 4 nodes as trust nodes.
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Visual representation of 30 node test case after merging by size

5. One of the input parameters is the minimum domain size, 𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛 , so this step addresses
this requirement by merging smallest domains with their smallest neighbors until all
domains meet 𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛 . In order to do this, the PDC places all remaining domains into a
priority queue based on size. While the smallest domain size on the queue is smaller
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than the 𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛 , merge that domain with its smallest neighbor. This can be done in
𝑂(𝑛𝑉 𝑛𝐷 log 𝑛𝐷 ) time, where 𝑛𝐷 is the number of domains.
As seen in Figure 8, The domains have been merged leaving only three domains
that all meet the 𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛 of six nodes. This snap shot still shows some overlap between
domains, and the graph still has too many possible trust nodes. At this point the
PDC is much closer to a solution.
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Network ﬂow construction of 30 node example
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6. Now that all domains meet 𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛 , this step runs a network ﬂow algorithm to ensure all
domains can still meet the size requirement after trust nodes are assigned to speciﬁc
domains. Figure 9 shows a network ﬂow diagram that is constructed then solved to
ﬁnd appropriate domains for trust nodes that are shared by multiple domains. To
make this clear, the network ﬂow graph seen is only constructed to help us with this
step which is assigning trust nodes to a speciﬁc domain. First, the network ﬂow has
an edge form the source to each possible trust node of capacity 1. Also edges of
capacity 1 ﬂow from each possible trust node to its respective domain. Finally, edges
ﬂow from each domain to the sink. The capacity of this edge is equal 𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛 to minus
the number of non-trust nodes in the domain. Note that if the number of non-trust
nodes is larger than 𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛 , then the capacity is set to zero, since that domain does
not need any trust nodes to meet the minimum domain size. The PDC can run this
√
maximum network ﬂow algorithm in 𝑂(∣𝑉 ∣2 × ∣𝐸∣) time, where ∣𝑉 ∣ is the number
of vertices in our constructed network and ∣𝐸∣ is the number of edges. The domains
can all satisfy the minimum domain size requirement if each edge into the sink is
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Visual representation of 30 node test case after network ﬂow assigned trust
nodes
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saturated. Otherwise, the PDC will choose one domain that is not satisﬁed and
merge it with its smallest neighbor. This process is repeated until all domains are
satisﬁed. This can be done in 𝑂(𝑛2𝐷 𝑛𝑇 (𝑛𝑇 + 𝑛𝐷 )2.5 ) time, where 𝑛𝑇 is the number
of trust nodes.
The purpose of the network ﬂow diagram is to determine which domain to
assign trust nodes. Some trust nodes are a part of multiple domains and they ultimately have to be a part of one domain. Solving the network ﬂow problem by the
method above will result in graph visualized in Figure 10 where all nodes including
trust nodes are only part of one domain.
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Visual representation of 30 node test case result

7. The ﬁnal problem for the PDC is to reduce the number trust nodes until it meets
𝑡𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 10 in this case. The PDC runs a greedy heuristic for the set cover problem to
complete the algorithm. The PDC repeatedly selects the domain with the smallest
ratio between the cost of the domain and the number of additional uncovered elements
until the whole graph is covered. This greedy set cover heuristic is guaranteed to
ﬁnd a set cover that is at most 𝐻𝑛 times more costly than the least expensive set
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cover, where 𝐻𝑛 is the harmonic number corresponding to the largest-sized subset.
The PDC can do this in 𝑂(𝑛𝐷 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑛𝐷 ) time. The ﬁnal set of domains is output with
trust nodes assigned.
The result of this 30 node example is in Figure 11. It shows exactly the same
domains with one major diﬀerence, which is the blue domain no longer has any trust
nodes. They needed to be removed to meet the 𝑡𝑚𝑎𝑥 requirement. Since all edges
leaving the blue domain lead to trust nodes, it still a valid solution to the TSPP.
The process just enumerated takes a power network like the one in Figure 6 and adds
trust nodes such that the network is subdivided into domains protected by trust nodes in
order to minimize the area that a virus or other network attack can cover before hitting a
ﬁrewall and/or an intrusion detection system. The resulting subdivision appears in Figure
11. The nodes are assigned so that they do not introduce delay beyond what is tolerable
to the devices that currently control and monitor the SCADA system.

3.7

Data Collection
When trying to record the eﬀectiveness of the PDC much data was collected. The

main metric that was the number of domains created. If the PDC creates the same or close
to the same number of domains as MILPM, then the solutions it provides can be deemed
close to optimal. PDC is said to be close if it can create the same amount f domains as
the MILPM or only one less. Therefore, the main piece of data collection from the PDC
simulations will be the number of domains created. However, this will not be only metric
used. Other metrics such as average number of trust nodes used and average domain size
can also help characterize how the PDC performed.

3.8

Summary
In this chapter some research goals where presented and discussed. The main goal, of

helping secure the SCADA network, was addressed. With these goals, challenges came that
need to be solved. Along the way, the goals and challenges are discussed and answered.
This chapter walks through the trust system assignment problem from the initial data to
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the solution of domains and trust nodes. The PDC heuristic steps are described in detail
ﬁnishing with a quick reasoning for the metrics used to collect data.
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4. Results and Analysis
4.1

Chapter Overview
This chapter documents a study of how much a heuristic solution like the PDC

will help the run time of a TSPP solver and how much it will cost in loss of optimality
from the MILPM. The details of the PDC experiments are speciﬁed in the discussion of
implementation, metrics, and parameters. Then the results are presented and discussed.
Then ﬁnally the PDC results are compared to the MILPM results.

4.2

Implementation
My contribution was the PDC, and I implemented nearly all of it in Java version 1.6

and augmented with the JiveSpace library [15]. The purpose of using the Jive space library
was for the ConcurrentHashSet data structure. Java’s generic HashSet data structure does
not allow concurrent modiﬁcation while iterating over the set. The ConcurrentHashSet
allows the PDC to make this concurrent modiﬁcation.
Operations involving network ﬂows used Andrew Goldberg’s HIPR version 3.6 [10].
Experiments were run using a Dell PowerEdge T605 machine running the CentOS 2.16
operation system. The machine had 2 quad-core AMD Opteron 2356 processors running
at 1.15 GHz and 8 GB of memory. Note that the PDC code was single-threaded so it only
took advantage of one processor.

4.3

Performance Metrics
The metrics for analyzing a solution to the TSPP are number of trust nodes used,

domains found, and domain size. With these three data points the analogous strengths
and weaknesses of opposing algorithms can be decided. In analyzing the the domain size,
the better solution to the TSPP will have domain sizes that are small. The solution does
not only need to have a small average, but also a small standard deviation. One would not
want to have one large domain and many small ones, because if the one large domain is
infected all systems in that large domain are eﬀected. The smaller the domain the smaller
the impact from an attack occurring in that domain. The number of domains found is
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another way a solution can be judged. If more domains are found for the same size input,
then the resulting domains are smaller.
Finally, the number of trust nodes used is another metric. The more trust nodes used,
the more the secure nodes are in the system. The fewer trust nodes used, the less expensive
it would be on the power company to implement the security system. The number of trust
nodes metric allows use to determine whether the solution is closer to our goal for a given
solution. The goal is to ﬁnd a good trade-oﬀ between security and cost.

4.4

Parameters
The parameters for the PDC test cases are shown in Table 3. Test cases one through

nine are are all the same 14 bus SCADA system only diﬀering by maximum trust nodes
allowed and minimum domain size allowed. These nine test cases are the only test cases
that can be compared to the MILPM results, because the MILPM could not complete
the larger test cases. One might think the MILPM results could be extrapolated, but the
larger test cases are too diﬀerent making it diﬃcult to extrapolated results. The PDC ran
various other larger test cases, and the 30 bus through 2953 bus parameters are displayed
as well. To determine the input parameters, the maximum number of trust nodes and the
minimum domain size, for the larger test cases we assigned parameter trying to be in the
realistic range of what power companies might want.

4.5

PDC Results
While the MILPM solution can give optimal answers, it is limited to relatively small

cases like the 14-bus and maybe the 30-bus. The PDC can handle much larger cases
with tens of thousands of nodes relatively quickly. In fact, even with the 2953 bus and
7,028 branch New York ISO with 500 path time constraints, the PDC took less than three
seconds. The PDC is not optimal, but results show that it gives results that are close to
optimal in the cases run.
The results of the all the PDC test cases are shown in Tables 4 and 6. The PDC
provided promising results. When compared to the MILPM optimal 14-bus solutions in
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Table 3
Test Case
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

Power Buses
14
14
14
14
14
14
14
14
14
30
30
30
57
57
57
118
118
118
2953
2953
2953

PDC Parameters

Power Branches
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
41
41
41
80
80
80
186
186
186
7028
7028
7028

32

Max Trust Nodes
2
2
2
4
4
4
7
7
7
10
10
15
25
29
34
46
50
54
500
500
1000

Min Domain Size
2
4
7
2
4
7
2
4
7
10
6
6
16
13
10
21
18
15
100
500
100

Figure 2, the number of domains created was often the same as the PDC. In all cases, at
most one additional domain was found by the MILPM when compared to the PDC. The
computational time diﬀerences were signiﬁcant. Even in the 2,953 bus case, the execution
ran in a matter of seconds. Conversely, the MILPM ran for 24 hours on a 30 bus case and
was still not done [11].
Besides the speciﬁc layout of the SCADA system, the most instrumental input parameters are the maximum trust nodes allowed and the minimum domain size. These
two parameters obviously aﬀect the resulting amount of trust nodes found and resulting
domains found. Intuitively, the more nodes required to create a domain the less domains
are likely to be found, because a bigger domain takes nodes from other domains. One
might think, the more trust nodes allowed the more domains can be found, for trust nodes
have to be next to edges that span domains. However, this is not always the case. First
observed in the MILPM evaluation in Section 2.7, this situation is also seen in the larger
cases. Test case 13 allows twice as many trust nodes a case 11, but on average only ﬁnds
about one more domain — an increase from 4.37 to only 5.36.
In analyzing these results, test case 3 produces only one domain. An optimal solution
would have compartmentalized the test case 3 into two domains. The PDC does not ﬁnd
this compartmentalization because of the strictness in which seven relates to 14. This
means the PDC would have to ﬁnd the right possible domains and merge small possible
domains with the correct neighbors. This is a small case. The strength of the PDC is in
large cases due to the signiﬁcantly better run time when compared to the MILPM.
One question that arises from the results: does the PDC continue to be as eﬀective
when extrapolated to the larger cases? This question is tough to answer because no optimal
solutions exist for comparison. In this event, educated observation is an option that can be
used to decide if the PDC is likely to be as eﬀective in the larger cases. Table 5 averages the
standard deviations in the small cases. It shows those averages as percentage of their test
case sizes. The percentages are remarkably close. This observation is hardly statistically
sound or scientiﬁc, but it is an alluring point. This perspective hints at the possibility of
the PDC being very eﬀective in large cases.
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Table 4

PDC Average Trust Nodes, Average Domains Found, and MILPM Domains
Found

Test Case
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

Average Trust Nodes
1.77
1.51
0.00
3.04
2.44
0.72
5.28
4.87
0.60
4.23
8.78
9.03
16.98
12.82
17.33
11.13
22.07
36.21
363.17
211.77
744.26

Table 5

Cases 1–9
Cases 19–21

Average Domains Found
2.00
1.76
1.00
2.19
1.81
1.18
3.00
1.81
1.15
1.66
2.86
2.16
2.58
2.16
3.14
2.08
2.40
4.05
4.37
1.66
5.36

MILPM Domains Found
2
2
2
3
3
2
5
3
2
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A

Small/Large Case Comparison

Average Standard Deviation
3.07
654.59
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Percentage
21.9%
22.2%

Table 6

PDC Maximum Number of Trust Nodes, Minimum Domain Size, Standard Deviation, and Average Domain Size
Test Case
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

Maximum
14
14
14
12
14
14
12
14
14
30
15
27
57
42
57
97
118
70
2935
2935
2935

Minimum
2
4
14
2
5
7
2
6
7
1
6
3
16
13
10
21
18
15
103
571
101
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Standard Deviation
4.93
2.69
0.00
3.77
2.87
3.24
3.68
2.87
3.09
7.48
3.51
5.13
6.01
7.32
8.07
30.44
32.49
14.44
637.87
835.18
490.71

Average
7.95
7.91
14.00
6.39
7.73
11.86
4.67
7.73
12.17
18.30
10.49
14.96
22.09
26.39
18.15
56.73
49.40
29.14
692.04
2139.62
630.18

Part of the research objective is to divide the SCADA network into as many domains
as possible. Figure 12 shows how well the PDC performed. The chart shows the domains
found for each test case one through nine. The MILPM plotted points are the optimal
number of domains found for that test case. The PDC plotted points are the heuristic
average number of domains found over 100 runs of each test case. The 95% conﬁdence
intervals are marked around the PDC points.
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Figure 12

MILPM and PDC Domains Found

The PDC has noteworthy results as it compares to the MILPM results. Some results
are within the conﬁdence interval, namely cases one and two. In other cases, namely
cases four, ﬁve, six, eight, and nine, the the conﬁdence interval comes close to the optimal
answer. Therefore, in the trials run, 77% (7/9 cases) of the time the PDC was statistically
identical to the optimal answer in this 14 bus case. With more trials, the gap between
PDC and MILPM may narrow further. This study is left to future work.
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4.6

Summary
This chapter has described the experiments run. The PDC was designed, imple-

mented, tested, executed, and the results analyzed. The PDC did well when compared to
the MILPM in domains created, and the PDC was able to run on large test cases producing
answers in a few seconds.
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5. Conclusion
5.1

Conclusion of Research
This work in Part I researched and developed an answer to the TSPP. Previous

research gives us an optimal answer to the TSPP. This work is just a heuristic solution.
The heuristic implemented in the PDC was compared to the optimal MILPM solution.
PDC preformed almost as good as the MILPM in the experiments performed, but the
PDC produced answers much quicker and for much larger data sets.

5.2

Future Work
It can be argued that maximizing the number of domains and maximizing security

are not the same, because domain sizes may be very diﬀerent. The experiments showed
that the domains were usually close in size, yet some rare cases were not close. A new
parameter could be added to penalize the PDC for uneven domains. A good approach
this would be to penalize the solution by diﬀerence between the size of a domain and the
minimum domain size. This penalty would encourage domains to be close in size.
Another possible avenue of work would be to explore other heuristic options and
compare their results with each other. A couple of generic heuristics that could be applied
to the trust system placement problem are a branch and/or bound depth ﬁrst search and
simulated annealing. All of these methods represent possibilities that this work did not
explore, but they are natural future extensions to this work.
Finally, as mentioned above, more trials would allow for a better examination of the
statistical signiﬁcance of MILPM versus PDC.
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Part II

Network Obfuscation
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6. Introduction
6.1

Background
The second half will explore network obfuscation. Network obfuscation is a relatively

new topic area that focuses on dynamically changing communication structure. In normal
network communication, many information ﬂows are pushed through the network. Some
of this information needs to be secured, and this research presents a way to help secure
information ﬂows. To keep things consistent and simple an information ﬂow will be known
as a commodity.
Although both topics of power grid security and network obfuscation fall in the same
large category of network security, they are not at this point considered for the same type
of system. Simply, the SCADA does not tolerate delays. Since it is unknown how much
delay an implemented network obfuscation technique would cause, chances are, that the
SCADA network would not be able to tolerate such a security system. Both network
security techniques could possibly operate over the same network, but this requires careful
consideration.
Network obfuscation makes it diﬃcult for attackers to gain information about the
network by frequently changing the way information is routed. Changing the network
routes and potentially the topology helps secure information ﬂows so that people can
communicate more securely. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)
Information Assurance Program existed from 1996 to 2001 with the goal to research the
hypothesis that secure systems could be constructed with less secure subsystems. The
general idea behind this hypothesis is that it is easier and/or more cost eﬀective to use less
secure systems.
Building block work on the topic of network obfuscation provides a mixed-integer
linear programming model (MILPM) to solve the network obfuscation problem. Several researchers have examined various heuristics for the multi-commodity capacitated
network design problem (MCNDP), which can be easily extended to form a network obfuscation problem. The “Algorithm Design” book by Kleinberg and Tardos presents a
greedy-disjoint-paths algorithm that can be extended to create a heuristic for network ob-
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fuscation problem [18]. The heuristic provides timely route and topology changes to help
prevent attackers from mapping and exploiting the network.

6.2

Problem Statement
The goal of this research is to design changing network routing and potentially topol-

ogy. These network changes are designed given speciﬁc network requirements and limitations. Most requirements and limitations are input that describe the network characteristics and commodities. Another limitation is based on changing from previous network
states. The objective is to design multiple networks that optimize the input with respect
to previous network states.

6.3

Summary
Part II of this thesis presents a heuristic for changing the network routing and po-

tentially topology. The focus of this research is to develop a fast network obfuscation
algorithm that can do a good job at quickly changing network topologies. The following
chapters will show the overall research that was done to make this algorithm work and
further explore the topic area of network obfuscation.
This chapter gives a general introduction to the research subject area and gives a brief
overview of the problem this thesis attempts to solve. In Chapter 7, the literature review
details the idea of using dynamic network address translation (DYNAT). It reviews the
multi-commodity capacitated network design problem and reviews an optimal solution to
creating topologies for network obfuscation. Next a network obfuscation heuristic (NOH)
is presented that solves the same network design problem as the optimal MILPM. Chapter 8 contains a full problem deﬁnition and key performance metrics heuristic approach to
evaluate the NOH. Next, the experiments and results are discussed in Chapter 9. Finally,
Chapter 10 sums up the key points and suggests future research.
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7. Literature Review
7.1

Chapter Overview
This chapter presents related work. Some of which indirectly relate to this work like

the AnyTraﬃc algorithm and other work more directly relates to the research in Part II,
like the optimal network obfuscation solution. The optimal solution in particular will be
used as a baseline for comparison in later chapters.

7.2

AnyTraﬃc Routing Algorithm
Creating a network topology involves ﬁnding a route for each commodity. The Any-

Traﬃc Routing Algorithm was designed to be able to function eﬃciently in a mixed unicast
and multicast environment. Traditional methods favor either unicast or multicast. Unicast
transmission is a message to a single destination, while multicast transmission is sending a
message to a group of destinations simultaneously. A classic shortest path method works
well for unicast traﬃc, but does not consider the multicast traﬃc [20]. The shortest path
algorithm takes each source-destination pair of unicast traﬃc to make point-to-point data
paths. For multicast traﬃc, the point-to-point data paths are replicated for each destination.
Inversely, the other methods like the Steiner tree heuristic focus on the multicast
traﬃc, while the unicast traﬃc suﬀers. A article entitled “AnyTraﬃc routing algorithm
for label-based forwarding” explains the Steiner tree heuristic [20]. To summarize, this
approach treats multicast and unicast traﬃc diﬀerently. The Steiner tree algorithm is used
mainly for multicast traﬃc. The unicast traﬃc is mapped to a point-to-point data path.
For the inclusive form of point-to-multi-point diﬀerent multicast groups can be combined
into a single data path. This means that some edge nodes will not be necessary for each
individual multicast group. This takes more bandwidth, allowing less state information
[20]. Point-to-multi-point can also be in selective form which is the form that will be
compared to the AnyTraﬃc algorithm instead of the inclusive form. For selective pointto-multi-point each multicast information ﬂow stands by itself as its own data ﬂow. This
has the opposite eﬀect of consuming less bandwidth at the expense of having to save more
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state maintenance. The Steiner tree heuristic is created by growing from the source and
adding one destination at a time. Once one destination is added to the tree, the others are
added by calculating the shortest path from the existing tree to the respective destination
not yet in the tree.

Figure 13

Example of AnyTraﬃc Routing Path [20]

The AnyTraﬃc routing algorithm clearly performs better than either the shortest
path algorithm or the Steiner tree heuristic in most mixed traﬃc scenarios. The AnyTraﬃc
routing algorithm is also a heuristic, because ﬁnding an optimum path for multicast traﬃc
is an NP-Complete problem. A key concept to understand about the AnyTraﬃc algorithm
is the creation of branch nodes. As you can see in Figure 13, the branch node is labeled
b1 and the data path splits at that branch node. In the initialization phase all of the links
costs are calculated. The costs are based on link distance and node degree. After the costs
are calculated, the algorithm then creates the shortest path from source to destination.
Then we move onto the computational phase, which iterates to ﬁnd each destination. The
destinations are found in an approach similar to that of the Steiner tree heuristic, but in a
limited way. If the current source and destinations can be covered by a previously solved
AnyTraﬃc route, then the current source and destinations are added to the route. For
more details on the AnyTraﬃc routing algorithm please see Pedro Pedroso’s work [20].
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7.3

Information Gathering or Reconnaissance
In order to launch a successful attack on a computer network, adversaries need to ﬁrst

gather information about the network. They go through various phases to gather information including footprinting and scanning. Footprinting and scanning can be performed
in many diﬀerent ways, such as port scanning, ping sweeps, etc., with many diﬀerent tools
such as traceroute [8]. The tools and techniques are changing all the time, because adversaries want to remain dynamic and hard to stop. Some of the intelligence they want is IP
addresses, port numbers, and network topology. From the network topology adversaries
can determine potential access paths into the network.

7.4

Dynamic Network Address Translation
DYNAT is an extension of network address translation. The static network address

translation modiﬁes the IP address in the datagram, so that the when the datagram goes
from one IP address space to another the destination is consistent. DYNAT adds to this
by having a single IP address map to multiple IP addresses in another address space. In
DARPA’s Information Assurance research program, Kewley used a DYNAT scheme that
changed the mapped IP address based on time [16].
The DYNAT technique used in Kewley’s DARPA research can be viewed in Figure
14. It shows that the client creates traﬃc which is immediately obfuscated in the DYNAT
shim by changing the destination IP address and destination port of the TCP/IP header.
This translation depends on a reestablish keying parameter that varies with time, basically
changing the mapping each time interval. The destination port is changed in addition to
the IP address in order to thwart many of the network-level traﬃc sniﬀers [16]. The
datagram then goes through the public wide area network where it can be sniﬀed and
arrives at the DYNAT gateway. The gateway has the same secret seeded key and uses it to
change the IP address and destination port back to the original. This type of translation
makes it very diﬃcult for adversaries to gain information on speciﬁc servers.
To demonstrate the eﬀectiveness of the DYNAT technique the Information Assurance
program created several experiments. The ﬁrst experiment focuses on the eﬀectiveness of
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DYNAT in a variety of scenarios. The key metric they used to evaluate the eﬀectiveness is
the amount of time it took for a red team (adversary) to gain enough intelligence to identify
a list of critical servers. One set of scenarios served as the control case using regular static
network address translation. The other set of scenarios used one DYNAT. The DYNAT
scenarios only varied in the amount of intelligence given to the red team. The work factor
increased by at least 2:1 to 4:1 depending on given intelligence, which was the time that
the red team needed to ﬁgure out critical servers [16]. This DYNAT can also help intrusion
detection. If the DYNAT is in place, any unexpected translation is suspicious; therefore,
it is easy to detect possible intrusions.

7.5

Network Flow Background
Topologies for network obfuscation can be found by solving network ﬂow problems.

The network ﬂow problem has a wide variety of applications from baseball elimination
to airline scheduling. It also applies to networks. Generally in a network ﬂow, a source
has information that needs to ﬂow to a destination. The idea is to get that commodity

Figure 14

DYNAT Flow From Client to Servers [16]
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from the source to destination given network restrictions. This problem can get quite
complicated when there are many commodities with diﬀering source-destination pairs. The
MCNDP and the maximum disjoint paths problem (MDPP) are both based fundamentally
on network ﬂows, yet they are more complex because they deal with multiple commodities
and potentially shifting topologies.

7.6

Multi-commodity Capacitated Network Design Problem
The MCNDP not only has many commodities to consider, but also has many other

parameters to describe the network ﬂow. One of the parameters is the set of commodities.
The term commodity refers to a collection of information that needs to be routed from a
source to destination with a required bandwidth. Assigning these commodities to a path
through a network is the basis for the MCNDP. The following assumptions apply to the
MCNDP: [8]

1. The number of nodes is ﬁxed.
2. Multiple commodities need to be routed.
3. Any commodity has a single source node and a single destination node (unicast).
4. Each edge has a ﬁxed capacity.
5. Nodes may have multiple types of interfaces.
6. There may be multiple edges between two nodes if each edge corresponds to a diﬀerent
type of interface. However, two nodes are limited to one connection per type of
interface.
7. Edges are bidirectional with symmetric capacity.
8. No node has edge loops.
9. The number of edges incident to a node cannot exceed the total number of interfaces
in the node.
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7.7

Optimal Network Obfuscation Solution
One way to obfuscate the network is to dynamically change the routes and possibly

the topology. If adversaries ﬁnd the routes and/or topology when gathering intelligence,
the information is only valid for a short time, which is the time it takes for the topology
to dynamic change again. In another scenario, if adversaries are listening on a particular
link, they may ﬁnd that the link is no longer routing the particular traﬃc that they are
listening for, or, even better, the link may no longer be active [8]. This dynamic change
helps prevent adversaries from easily mapping the network.
For a network obfuscation article, Compton developed a MILPM to optimally solve
the MCNDP [8]. The MILPM mathematically deﬁnes statements 1-9 from Section 7.6.
With the problem mathematically deﬁned, MILPM solvers can be run to create the optimal
topology. The purpose of the network obfuscation solution is to create many topologies
that dynamically change over time. To create many diﬀerent topologies, the MILPM model
had to be augmented to penalize a topology for being similar to the previous topologies.
This forces the next topology to be signiﬁcantly diﬀerent.
Since each topology is diﬀerent, this introduces the problem that some of them may
not be optimal. The ﬁrst topology is guaranteed to be optimal since the previous penalty
does not factor into its creation, but subsequent topologies have a chance to be suboptimal. Compton’s experimental work shows that even though these subsequent solutions are
suboptimal they are still very close to optimal in his test environment [8].

7.8

Summary
The purpose of network obfuscation is to make it diﬃcult for adversaries to gather

information necessary to launch an attack. Information gathering and reconnaissance is
the ﬁrst step that adversaries take on their way to attacking a network. Both DYNAT and
dynamically changing topologies are ways that can thwart adversaries in their early stages
of launching an attack.
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8. Methodology
8.1

Chapter Overview
The second half of this thesis addresses the network security problem of securing

information ﬂows. The previous chapter showed two techniques that try to address this
problem. The ﬁrst is the DYNAT technique which changes identifying information in the
messages. The second is a polymorphic networking technique that changes the routes and
potentially the topology. Research has shown both of these techniques are eﬀective at
accomplishing their goals. The MILPM doing polymorphic networking is not very scalable
because it is optimally trying to solve an NP-Complete problem.
The work presented here is an extension of the polymorphic networking technique.
The idea is to take the optimal network obfuscation solution discussed in Section 7.7 and
make a completely new version using good heuristics. The heuristic solution, called the
NOH, and the optimal solution solve the same problem. This allows us to compare their
diﬀering answers.

8.2

Problem Description
Compton’s network obfuscation solution is based on a modiﬁed MCNDP from Section

7.6 with an additional loop to create multiple topologies and a penalty to force the routes
and topologies to vary. The loop creates new routing scheme and new series of topologies
each time through. This penalty in the MCNDP prevents the NOH from selecting the same
topology. It does this by assigning a bad score for selecting the same link and a better
score for selecting a diﬀerent link. If a network would cycle through all possible topologies,
especially smaller networks, the will start over with the ﬁrst topology. This can be done in
a couple diﬀerent ways. One way is watch the score for each topology restarting if it gets
too low, and another way is to reset automatically after a given number of iterations. My
contribution is the NOH which performs polymorphic networking in a more timely manor.
It does not produce optimal answers, but is fairly close.
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8.3

Heuristic Approach
A heuristic is required to operate on network of larger scale, like thousands of nodes

or more, while a fast optimal solver would be ideal, but the MCNDP is NP-Complete [1].
The NOH algorithm is eﬃcient and quick, but will not necessary ﬁnd optimal solutions.
The NOH was developed by augmenting a greedy pricing algorithm. This greedy algorithm
is a 𝑂(4𝑚1/3 + 1) − 𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 heuristic. The NOH only adds a constant factor to the
greedy pricing algorithm making the NOH a polynomial-time-approximation as well.
The greedy pricing algorithm ﬁnds the number of paths that are edge-disjoint between
a source-destination pair. A path is edge-disjoint from another path if the path does not
share any edges. In the MCNDP there is a list of commodities. Each commodity speciﬁes
a source, destination, and bandwidth requirement. The greedy pricing algorithm solves
the MDPP, while the NOH solves the MCNDP. The NOH is augmented with interfaces to
enable it to ﬁnd solutions to the MCNDP. An interface is a type of communication medium,
for example, ﬁber optic cable, phone line, wireless radio waves, or Ethernet cable. The
interfaces allow multiple edges to link the same two nodes as long as they are on a diﬀerent
interface. Many networks only use one interface, but when designing a new network one
must consider allowing multiple interfaces for redundancy and reliability. The MCNDP
requires input to specify how many interfaces.
Figure 15 shows pseudocode for the NOH algorithm which loops through the commodities to create a graph. The Create-Graph function is run each time a new topology
needs be created to change the network. The NOH returns a graph of nodes and edges
that represent the active links in the new topology. The code in the function starts by
looping through each commodity. Then while inside the loop, it initializes the graph for
a modiﬁed Dijkstra’s algorithm to ﬁnd the shortest path from the commodity’s source to
destination. Once a path is found, the capacity of the path is checked to see if it can handle
the bandwidth requirement. If not, the code ﬁnds paths to add to a multipath until the
bandwidth requirement is met. If no such multipath exists, fulﬁlling the requirement the
commodity is ignored. Most if not all of the time the path for commodity is found.
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FUNCTION Create-Graph() returns G(N,E)
foreach (Commodity c in Commodities) {
Initialize-Dijkstra-Source(c.source);
Path p = Dijkstra(c);
Update-Graph(p);
Increment-Used(p);
}
FUNCTION Dijkstra(Commodity c)
PriorityQueue priority-queue(nodes); //put all the nodes in the queue
while(priority-queue is not empty) {
Node n = extract-min(priority-queue);
foreach (Edge e adjacent to n) {
Dijkstra-Relax(n, get_neighbor(n, e), c);
}
}
FUNCTION Dijkstra-Relax(Node n, Node neighbor, Commodity c)
foreach(Interface i in Interfaces) {
Edge e = get_edge(n, neighbor, i);
if (neighbor.distance > n.distance + e.distance) {
neighbor.distance = n.distance + e.distance;
e.smallest_interface = i;
}
}
Figure 15

NOH pseudocode for augmented disjoint path heuristic algorithm
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When the path is found, the Dijkstra function returns. Next, the path is added to the
topology via Update-Graph. The Update-Graph method takes the path and updates how
much bandwidth is still available after the commodity uses the path. The Increment-Used
function records the edges that were used to create the path in the “used” data structure.
This is needed because then the edges will cost more the next time a topology is created.
If the previously used edges cost more, then the algorithm is more likely to choose diﬀerent
paths. These diﬀerent paths then cause the topology to change.

8.4

Maximum Disjoint Paths Problem
The MDPP is less complex version of the MCNDP because that the MDPP does

not have as many parameters. The MDPP requires a list of commodities with a goal to
satisfy as many commodities as possible given the edge capacities. The Internet is a good
example. It serves up streaming media or Web data, which can follow multiple paths
through the network. These data paths can share the same edge. However, too many data
paths on an edge will cause performance problems. The maximum amount of sharing for
a single edge diﬀers depending on the amount of data required. The data required to get
from one destination to another would be a commodity.
A greedy pricing algorithm, designed by Kleinberg and Tardos, provides a solution
to the MDPP [18]. They provide pseudocode and an algorithm analysis indicating this
algorithm’s approximation factor [18]. The algorithm continually ﬁnds paths for each
commodity until it can no longer ﬁnd a path or the commodities run out. This greedy
algorithm makes edges with less capacity more expensive in order to encourage paths to
be spread evenly. The idea is to keep all the edge options open as long as possible. This
way each commodity’s path does not restrict the subsequent commodity as much.

8.5

Data Collection
All of the same test cases that previous research used will be run through the NOH

[8]. Then, the size of the test cases will be doubled until the it is no longer realistic to test
in the time frame alloted The key pieces of data will be collected for each of these runs
which are quality score, run time, and amount of change.
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The key data points will be recorded for each test case. The ﬁrst piece of data
collected from the NOH is the topology score. This score helps us in evaluating the quality
of the solution with respect to the changing routes/topologies. The second piece of data
collected will be the run time. The run time will be compared to the MILP run time.
Lastly, change from topology to topology will be calculated and collected from the NOH
runs.

8.6

Summary
In this chapter research goals were presented. A potential solution to answer those

goals was also introduced. Finally, a methodology was deﬁned to guide a comparison
between the NOH heuristic and the MILPM optimal algorithm.
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9. Results and Analysis
9.1

Chapter Overview
This chapter compares MILPM results and NOH results. First, it brieﬂy describes

the experimental setup, described, and measured the data. Next, the NOH results are
presented according to the metrics and an analysis of the results are presented.

9.2

Implementation
The pseudocode from Figure 15 for the NOH was developed and implemented in

C++. The computations were run same Linux servers that ran the PDC from Part I, so
again the experiments were run using a Dell PowerEdge T605 machine running the CentOS
2.16 operation system. The machine had 2 quad-core AMD Opteron 2356 processors acting
in tandem running at 1.15 GHz per core and 8 GB of memory. Note that PDC code was
single-threaded so it only took advantage of one processor.

9.3

Performance Metrics
To evaluate and compare MILPM solution to NOH solution, metrics need to be

deﬁned for measuring the performance of both the MILPM and the NOH. The metrics
need to be able to show how close the NOH is to the optimal MILPM. The 𝛿 diﬀerence
between topologies is measured. If the 𝛿 values are close, within a fair conﬁdence interval
of the optimal answer, then the NOH can be called a success.
Equation 10 measures the diﬀerence between two routing conﬁgurations. The term
𝑟𝑘 is the required bandwidth needed to route commodity 𝑘 through the network. The term
𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑓 𝑘 is the utilization percentage of the total capacity of an edge from 𝑖 to 𝑗 on interface
𝑓 for commodity 𝑘. Finally, the term 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑓 is one if the edge from 𝑖 to 𝑗 on interface 𝑓 is
used. Otherwise, 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑓 is zero.
∑𝐾 (
𝛿(𝑤𝑡1 , 𝑤𝑡2 ) =

𝑘=1

𝑟𝑘 ⋅

∑𝐾
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𝑖,𝑗∈𝑁

[∑
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(𝑡
)
−
𝑥
(𝑡
)∣
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𝑓 =1 𝑖𝑗𝑓 𝑘 2
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𝑓 =1

2

(10)

Table 7
Nodes
Commodities per Node

Interface Types per Node

Table 8
Nodes
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40

Test Conﬁgurations
5
1
2
3
1
2
3
4

10
1
2
3
1
2
3
4

15
1
2
3
1
2
3
4

20
1
2
3
1
2
3
4

25
1
2
3
1
2
3
4

30
1
2
3
1
2
3
4

35
1
2
3
1
2
3
4

40
1
2
3
1
2
3
4

MILPM and NOH Run Times and 𝛿

MILPM 𝜇 Run Time
0.028
0.116
2.837
99.107
500.394
42.178
161.600
208.847

MILPM 𝜇𝛿
0.358
0.190
0.134
0.108
0.093
0.090
0.086
0.048

NOH 𝜇 Run Time
0.00048
0.00360
0.00488
0.01048
0.01550
0.01257
0.01307
0.02527

NOH 𝜇𝛿
0.048
0.075
0.081
0.071
0.073
0.080
0.066
0.021

The run time is also an important metric. A timer is set to record the execution
time of both the MILPM and the NOH. The resulting times can be compare to ﬁnd out
which method is faster.

9.4

Experimental Design
The experiments are designed to be exactly like the MILPM experiments. This way

the results of both the MILPM and the NOH can be compared. The NOH will be run on
the same test conﬁgurations that were already run using the MILPM. The MILPM model
varied the number of nodes, the commodities per node, and number of interfaces. The test
conﬁgurations showing all these test conﬁgurations are in Table 7. Each test conﬁgurations
has 30 diﬀerent pseudorandom test cases.

54

9.5

NOH Results
The NOH experiments and the metrics collected were compared to Compton’s MILPM

results. Both the run time and the diﬀerence between topologies are used for comparison.
In Table 8, the MILPM and NOH results are displayed. The run time is in seconds. The
ﬁrst column shows the number of nodes. The next two columns show the MILPM results,
and the last two columns show the NOH results. The results are averaged over all commodity sets, interface types, test cases, and iterations. One could assume that the more
nodes in the network the more variability there would be resulting in a higher 𝜇𝛿 for the
optimal MILPM results. I am no sure exactly why the diﬀerence seems to get small, but
I would suggest that in smaller networks changing one path has a more signiﬁcant eﬀect
on the calculation than in larger networks. When comparing the MILPM and the NOH,
the run time the NOH is much faster than the linear programming model in all cases. The
delta diﬀerence is close for most test cases. The most distance case is the ﬁve node case
which does not matter as much because the NOH is designed to run on larger test cases.

9.6

Summary
This chapter compares the NOH heuristic with Compton’s optimal MILPM solver.

The heuristic results are much quicker than the optimal results. Even all the large test
cases ran in a matter of seconds. Experiments suggest that the NOH heuristic ﬁnds results
that are close to optimal.
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10. Conclusion
10.1

Conclusion of Research
Part II of this thesis presented the Network Obfuscation Heuristic algorithm which

creates multiple routing and potentially topology changes to obfuscate the network. This
is a proactive and novel approach to network security, which is novel because most of the
time network security is done in a reactive or defensive mode. The heuristic was analyzed
and was shown to be close to optimal in the experiments run. The NOH ran quickly and
on larger network sizes demonstrating the algorithm’s scalability.

10.2

Future Work
In future work, many goals still need to be met. The ﬁrst of which is the heuristic

needs more thorough experiments to see how close to optimal it is. Also, the heuristic
simulation on larger network sizes to test its scalability.
This thesis makes a new heuristic for the network obfuscation problem based on the
greedy pricing algorithm, but extending one of the MCNDP heuristics, like Kleeman’s
or Oimoen’s work, also has the potential to produce a heuristic solution for the network
obfuscation problem [17][19]. To extend the MCNDP heuristics a penalty needs to be
added to the equation. Once an initial topology is created, a technique to add a penalty
to the constraints is found in Compton’s research [8]. If a commodity chooses some of the
same edges that it chose the previous time, it will have to pay the penalty for those edges.
Extending a MCNDP heuristic could produce a better heuristic and because only a small
part needs to be added, producing a new solution could be easier.
Network obfuscation causes the adversaries to take a longer time to gather information needed to launch an attack and/or causes information to go stale. This can be
demonstrated by actual scenarios with simulated adversaries. The amount of overhead in
the changing network should be investigated more thoroughly. In general, there are several
technical issues to be overcome in real implementation.

56

Appendix A. Mixed-integer Linear Programing Model for Trust System Placement
Problem
This mathematical deﬁnition was created by Jaun Carlos Gonzalez [3]. Maximize the
objective function
𝑛𝑉
∑

𝑧𝑖

(11)

𝑖=1

subject to the following constraints.

𝑥𝑖𝑙 ∈ {0, 1} for 𝑖, 𝑙 = 1, . . . , 𝑛𝑣

(12)

𝑦𝛼𝑖 ∈ {0, 1} for 𝛼 = 1, . . . , 𝑛𝑇 and 𝑖 = 1, . . . , 𝑛𝑣

(13)

𝑟𝑙 = 0 or 𝑟𝑙 ≥ 𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛 for 𝑙 = 1, . . . , 𝑛𝑣

(14)

𝑧𝑙 ∈ {0, 1} for 𝑙 = 1, . . . , 𝑛𝑣

(15)

𝑓𝑖𝑗𝑙 ∈ {0, 1} for 𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑙 = 1, . . . , 𝑛𝑣

(16)

ℎ𝑖𝑗 ∈ {0, 1} for 𝑖, 𝑗 = 1, . . . , 𝑛𝑣

(17)

𝑓𝑖𝑗𝑙 ≥ 𝑥𝑖𝑙 + 𝑥𝑗𝑙 + 𝑎𝑖𝑗 − 2.5 for 𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑙 = 1, . . . , 𝑛𝑣

(18)

1
𝑓𝑖𝑗𝑙 ≤ (𝑥𝑖𝑙 + 𝑥𝑗𝑙 + 𝑎𝑖𝑗 ) for 𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑙 = 1, . . . , 𝑛𝑣
3

(19)

57

ℎ𝑖𝑗 +

𝑛𝑉
∑

𝑓𝑖𝑗𝑙 = 𝑎𝑖𝑗 for 𝑖, 𝑗 = 1, . . . , 𝑛𝑣

(20)

𝑖=1

𝑛𝑉
∑

𝑥𝑖𝑗 = 1 for 𝑖 = 1, . . . , 𝑛𝑣

(21)

𝑦𝛼𝑖 ≤ 1 for 𝑖 = 1, . . . , 𝑛𝑣

(22)

𝑦𝛼𝑖 ≤ 1 for 𝛼 = 1, . . . , 𝑛𝑣

(23)

𝑖=1

𝑛𝑇
∑
𝑖=1

𝑛𝑉
∑
𝑖=1

𝑟𝑙 =

𝑛𝑉
∑

𝑥𝑖𝑙 for 𝑙 = 1, . . . , 𝑛𝑣

(24)

𝑖=1

𝑧𝑙 ≤ 𝑟𝑙 for 𝑙 = 1, . . . , 𝑛𝑣

⎡⎛
⎞ (
)⎤
𝑛𝑉 ∑
𝑛𝑉
𝑛𝑉
𝑛𝑉
𝑛𝑇
∑
∑
∑
∑
𝛿
1
⎣⎝
⋅
(𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑘 ⋅ 𝑏𝑖𝑗 ) + ⋅
𝑐′𝑖𝑗𝑘 ⎠ ⋅
𝑦𝛼𝑖 ⎦ ≤ 𝜏𝑘 for 𝑘 = 1, . . . , 𝑛𝑃
2
2
𝑖=1 𝑗=1

𝑖=1

𝑦𝛼𝑖 ≤

𝑛𝑉
∑

(25)

(26)

𝛼=1

𝑗=1

ℎ𝑖𝑗 for 𝛼 = 1, . . . , 𝑛𝑇 and 𝑖 = 1, . . . , 𝑛𝑣

(27)

𝑗=1

𝑛𝑇
∑

(𝑦𝛼𝑖 + 𝑦𝛼𝑗 ) ≥ ℎ𝑖𝑗 for 𝑖, 𝑗 = 1, . . . , 𝑛𝑣

𝛼=1

58

(28)

Appendix B. Power Systems Test Case Archive
The power system data sets have visual representations provide by the Power Systems Test
Case Archive [4]. The Power Domain Calculator (PDC) used all four test cases.

Figure 16

The 14 Bus Flow Test Case is an actual portion of the power grid in Midwestern United States controlled American Electric Power System in 1962.
[4]
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Figure 17

The 30 Bus Flow Test Case is an actual portion of the power grid in Midwestern United States controlled American Electric Power System in 1961.
[4]
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Figure 18

The 118 Bus Flow Test Case is an actual portion of the power grid in Midwestern United States controlled American Electric Power System in 1962.
[4]
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Figure 19

The 2,953 Bus Flow Test Case of the former New York Power Pool
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